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Abstract: The extraordinary events of the last couple of years, like the surge and the topsy-turvy movement in oil, raw 
material and food prices, or the development of a so far unprecedented global financial and economic crisis, have been 
heavily testing the endurance of those earning their living from agriculture and related activities. All these troubles have 
not been beneficial to the ongoing trade liberalization process within the framework of WTO. Answers to the challenges 
at national level and the continuing proliferation of inter- and intraregional free trade agreements make the early global 
liberalization even less probable. The situation is further complicated by those really divergent changes of agricultural 
policy that are about to develop on the opposite sides of the Atlantic. In this paper, we describe the recent development 
of world’s agricultural production and trade; offer an insight into the evaluation problems of worldwide food insecurity; 
and briefly compare the upcoming agricultural policy reforms in Europe and the US. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the first decade of this century, the 
media has become more and more inundated with 
reports and articles warning of growing hunger in the 
world, a joint consequence of rising demand in protein 
of some highly populated developing countries, the 
climate change with all its repercussions on agricultural 
production and prices, and a new spread of poverty 
and homelessness, as a by-product of the global 
financial and economic crisis. Since 1995-1997, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) regularly reports on the growing number 
of the undernourished, with consolidated data for 2008 
and estimates for 2009 and 2010 clearly above 900 
million people. The total number of undernourished 
people in the world was even estimated to have 
reached more than 1000 million in 2009, and their 
proportion within the population of the developing 
countries to have risen again since 2008, the latter 
being not only a reversion of a decades’ long tendency 
but also opposite to the Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) target of halving the prevalence of 
undernourishment by 2015 [1]. 
Under such circumstances, it is interesting to 
examine whether developments in agricultural and food 
production and trade can explain such tendencies in 
world hunger, or if not, what could be the cause of the 
phenomenon. 
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2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
As one can clearly see from the image given by 
FAO statistics, world agricultural production – the net 
output, i.e. net of seed and feed costs – has 
continuously been increasing over the last 20 years 
(Figure 1). Moreover, this growth even speeded up in 
the second half of the period, which could be seen in 
the growing steepness of the diagram. Fortunately, this 
speeding up was faster in those regions where it was 
the most needed: in least developed and net food 
importing developing countries, while in Africa, the 
production growth rate could be maintained at a 
relatively high level for most of the period (Table 1). By 
contrast, in developed countries, and particularly in 
Europe, the production growth has been much slower 
for the whole period, due to differences in demographic 
path of the two worlds. Indeed, the agricultural sector, 
unlike the processing industry, is mostly driven by the 
internal demand (and the need for maintaining a certain 
level of security stock), and the world export market is 
rather viewed as residual market to absorb the 
redundant supply after the domestic demand has been 
satisfied. That’s why world market prices for agricultural 
products are relatively low, as traders seek to getting 
rid of their perishable goods which cannot be stocked 
for long without degradation of quality. 
From the aspect of food security, per capita rather 
than total agricultural production is of primary 
importance for the people (Figure 2 and Table 2). The 
best results were achieved by Asia and South-America, 
while the least developed and net food importing 
developing countries followed the world tendency. The 
same was true for Africa until 2006, but since then its 
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Figure 1: Net Agricultural Production Index (2004-2006 = 100). 
Source: FAOSTAT [2]. FAO indices of net agricultural production testify the relative level of the aggregate volume of agricultural 
production for each and every year of the examined period in comparison with the base period of 2004-2006. The indices are 
based on price-weighted quantities after deductions have been made of products used as seed or feed. 
 
Table 1: Changes of Net Agricultural Production Index (2004-2006 = 100), and Changes in Dynamics of Annual 
Average Changes in the First and Second Part of the Examined Period  
 
2011/ 
1990 
2000/ 
1990 
2011/ 
2001 
2000/1990 av. 
change 
/year (A) 
2011/2001 av. 
change 
/year (B) 
B/A 
Net Food Importing Developing Countries 84.8% 32.0% 37.4% 2.81% 3.23% 114.82% 
European Union 5.2% 4.2% 2.0% 0.41% 0.20% 47.48% 
Least Developed Countries 96.4% 33.0% 40.7% 2.89% 3.47% 120.24% 
World 63.9% 24.3% 30.0% 2.20% 2.66% 120.73% 
Africa 84.6% 35.8% 32.8% 3.11% 2.88% 92.49% 
Northern America 34.2% 22.5% 12.3% 2.05% 1.16% 56.86% 
South America 112.2% 40.4% 45.5% 3.45% 3.82% 110.81% 
Asia 113.4% 48.1% 41.3% 4.00% 3.51% 87.80% 
Australia and New Zealand 40.1% 32.5% 1.3% 2.85% 0.12% 4.37% 
Source: FAOSTAT [2]; av = average. 
performance has been closer to that of the developed 
than that of the developing world. This change is very 
bad news for the continent with the world’s fastest 
growing population. While in North-America, the 
decades-long increase in per capita production turned 
into stagnation, there is, since the end of the last 
century, a clear decreasing trend both in Europe and 
Australia. (In New Zealand, too, there has been some 
decline in per capita production since 2004, but much 
less than in Australia.) But, the causes of these 
negative trends are different: in Europe, it is the 
outcome of two-decades of efforts to curb 
overproduction of basic commodities like cereal, meat, 
milk and sugar; in Australia, it is increasingly due to 
climate change, i.e. more and more frequent and 
prolonged periods of drought.  
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Figure 2: Net Agricultural per capita Production Index (2004-2006 = 100). 
Source: FAOSTAT [2]. 
 
Table 2: Changes of Net Agricultural Production Index Per Capita (2004-2006 = 100), and Changes in Dynamics of 
Annual Average Changes in the First and Second Part of the Examined Period  
 
2011/ 
1990 
2000/ 
1990 
2011/ 
2001 
2000/1990 av. 
change 
/year (A) 
2011/2001 av. 
change 
/year (B) 
B/A 
Net Food Importing Developing 
Countries 
20.1% 4.1% 15.7% 0.40% 1.64% 404.69% 
European Union -6.6% -3.3% -2.5% -0.33% -0.28% 84.94% 
Least Developed Countries 17.7% 2.9% 11.8% 0.29% 1.25% 434.56% 
World 24.5% 8.3% 14.6% 0.80% 1.53% 191.50% 
Africa 12.1% 7.2% 4.7% 0.69% 0.51% 74.23% 
Northern America 8.6% 10.7% 1.4% 1.02% 0.15% 15.06% 
South America 58.1% 19.7% 29.0% 1.82% 2.87% 157.80% 
Asia 58.9% 25.6% 25.5% 2.30% 2.56% 111.12% 
Australia and New Zealand 6.3% 16.7% -11.9% 1.56% -1.40% -89.86% 
Source: FAOSTAT [2]; av = average. 
It is to be noticed that 2008 CAP Reform known as 
“Health Check” decided on the termination of supply 
control measures in two of the main product groups: it 
abolished arable set-aside (in place since 1992) with 
immediate effect and started a gradual increase for 
milk quotas (in place since 1984) leading up to their 
abolition in 2015 (European Commission 2008) 
According to the agreement on the newest CAP reform, 
reached by the European Parliament, the EU Council 
of Ministers and the European Commission on late 
June 2013, sugar quotas will be abolished by 2017 [3].  
Naturally, following the global tendencies, not only 
the agricultural production but also the trade of 
agricultural products has steadily increased. And this 
growth was even faster than that of the output: the 
volume of internationally traded agricultural goods has 
practically doubled during the last 15 years [4]. (This 
statement may probably be considered as an estimate 
since trade statistics in agricultural products, 
comparable to those on production, are not available 
on the FAO homepage. Researchers need to be 
content with data in value (Figure 3 and Table 3). 
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Figure 3: Agricultural Export Value (bn $). 
Source: FAOSTAT [5]. 
 
Table 3: Changes of Agricultural Export Value and Changes in Dynamics of the Changes Between the First and 
Second Part of the Examined Period 
 2010/ 
1989 
1999/ 
1989 (A) 
2010/ 
2000 (B) 
B/A 
Net Food Importing Developing Countries 2.30 0.98 2.54 2.61 
European Union 3.29 1.44 2.41 1.68 
Least Developed Countries 2.51 1.04 2.63 2.53 
World 3.57 1.38 2.62 1.90 
Africa 2.87 1.21 2.61 2.16 
Northern America 2.95 1.29 2.13 1.64 
South America 5.92 1.69 3.68 2.17 
Asia 4.67 1.39 3.36 2.41 
Australia and New Zealand 2.48 1.15 2.02 1.76 
Source: FAOSTAT [5]. 
Nevertheless, from a comparison of charts describing 
the evolution of production (in volume) and those of 
trade flows (in value), some conclusions can be drawn. 
First, while data show an almost linear increase of the 
produced volumes, fluctuations are observed in trade 
values. Second, these fluctuations have recently 
become much more pronounced as a consequence of 
increased volatility in world food market prices. Third, 
as in the case of production, Asia and South America 
exhibited the fastest growth rates for exports, due to 
both their improving competitiveness and their abilities 
to make use of trade liberalisation fostered by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
As in the past twenty years, global trade rose much 
faster than production (both for agricultural and food 
products [6]), and production rose much faster than 
(world) population, the growth in per capita trade 
exceeded growth in per capita production. Hence, 
neither the increase in food prices nor a possible 
increase in the number of undernourished people can 
simply be explained by the shortage of supply. A 
certain precaution in wording is justified as FAO 
publications on undernourishment have until very 
recently suggested that, in spite of a continuous 
expansion of supply, the number of World hungry could 
not be prevented from rising since the mid 1990s (see 
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the red pecked line on Figure 4). This trend got even 
worse with the steep increase in food prices as of 2006 
and the outbreak of world economic and financial crisis 
in 2008; these two phenomena together caused a 
reversal of a decades’ long tendency of diminution of 
the proportion of the undernourished in the developing 
world [7,8]. 
3. WORLD HUNGER 
As a matter of fact, FAO data on hunger had 
generally been considered as reliable, since they fitted 
the empirical results. Obviously, it is no use to produce 
more and more food if it is not available to everyone. In 
the absence of sufficient demand, extra food can be 
turned into animal feed, industrial raw material or 
become waste. The quantitative development of 
production and the resulted food abundance in itself is 
no guarantee for complete food security even in the 
European Union. Table 4 shows that eating of meat, 
fish or a protein equivalent every second day is a 
problem for 6-7 per cent of the population in the old 
member states, and for every fifth people in the new 
ones.  
What is true in Europe is true at global level too: the 
issue of food security cannot be reduced simply to a 
question of supply or production. In agriculture not only 
the quantity of production matters, but also the 
question of who produces for whom, at what prices and 
for how much profit. If developed countries try to 
overcome world hunger by increasing their own 
capacity and production, so without considering the 
interests of small-scale farming in developing countries, 
only hunger and malnutrition will increase [11]. Also, 
producing food and transporting it to countries suffering 
from hunger does not automatically result in a 
reduction of the number of undernourished. In order to 
provide food to consumers not only solvable demand 
but also transportation and storage infrastructure are 
necessary [12]. 
Concerning the aggravation of hunger, one cannot 
avoid mentioning the responsibility of international 
trade. It is well known that since the 1980s, a huge 
number of developing countries have turned from net 
exporters to net importers of food, a phenomenon in 
which subsidised exports from both Europe and the US 
played an important role. First, by spending a lot of 
money on both direct and indirect export subsidies, the 
European integration and the United States almost 
triggered a trade war against each other for the world 
agro-food markets. Then, during the GATT Uruguay 
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Figure 4: Changes in world net agricultural (global and per capita) production index (left scale, 2004-2006=100) and in 
number of undernourished people (million head, right scale). 
Source: FAO [7,8,27,28]; FAOSTAT [2]. 
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Round, they arrived at a compromise (Blair House 
Agreement) which practically excluded other GATT 
contracting parties from agricultural discussion, and 
exempted the major part of the EU and US market 
support measures (i.e. the compensatory payments of 
1992 CAP reform and the deficiency payments of the 
US farm bill, both of them working as indirect export 
subsidies) from the obligation of gradual reduction [13]. 
The increasing quantity of cheap import food which 
invaded the local markets made it impossible for 
indigenous farmers to continue with their own 
production and forced them to leave and seek non-
agricultural/urban jobs. As cities, however, cannot 
provide employment for everyone, a significant share of 
the immigrant population only increased the number of 
those living in slums.  
It is less known that the developed countries may 
increase misery and hunger in the third world not only 
by their cheap food exports but also by their expanding 
food imports. As a result of decades-long bargaining 
process with the United States – with such milestones 
like the Dillon Round of GATT (1960-61) where the EU 
made momentous concessions by having granted zero 
tariff on major feedstuffs, and the Blair House 
Agreement (1992) in which the EU committed itself to 
self-limitation of its planted area with oilseeds – protein 
crops currently occupy only 3 per cent of EU’s total 
arable land and production meets only 20 per cent of 
demand [14]. European feed manufacturers have 
increasingly been replacing locally produced cereals 
and protein crops with cheap imports of soya and other 
feedstuffs from mainly North and South Americas. The 
imports of soya alone require more than 19 million 
hectares to be cultivated abroad, roughly 40 per cent of 
the total virtual land import of the EU. The largest areas 
planted with soya for European feed consumption are 
located in Brazil and Argentina where about three 
quarters of the EU soybean and soybean meal imports 
originate, but the neighbouring countries (especially 
Paraguay) also play an increasing role as suppliers.  
In 2010, 68 per cent of EU soybeans imports came 
from South America (45% from Brazil, 17% from 
Paraguay, 4% from Uruguay, 2% from Argentina) and 
30 per cent from North America (21% from the USA, 
9% from Canada). As far as the origins of EU soybean 
meal imports are concerned, the share of South 
America was even higher (93% of which 51% for 
Argentina, 42% for Brazil), while that of the USA was 5 
per cent [15]. 
Thanks to the modern technology (i.e. pesticide-
intensive cultivation of genetically modified soya 
Table 4: Hardship and Risk of Poverty in the New Members of the EU 
Inability to afford a meal with meat, 
chicken, fish
a 
At risk of poverty/social exclusion  
% of total population  In Millions 
  2005 2008 2011 2008 2010 2011 2011 
Bulgaria 29.6 43.2 50.8 38.2 41.6 49.1 3.7 
Latvia 23.4 26.8 30.8 33.8 38.1 40.1 0.9 
Hungary 26.1 27.6 29.0 28.2 29.9 31.0 3.1 
Slovakia 29.2 23.0 23.2 20.6 20.6 20.6 1.1 
Lithuania 19.1 23.2 23.0 27.6 33.4 23.5 0.2 
Romania 19.2 21.3 21.8 44.2 41.4 40.3 8.6 
EU 12 (new MS) 20.6 20.0 20.5 31.2 30.2 30.5 31.4 
Croatia : 15.7 16.9 n.a. 31.3 32.7 1.4 
Poland 20.7 15.5 14.1 30.5 27.8 27.2 10.2 
Czech Republic 12.2 9.7 10.7 15.3 14.4 15.3 1.6 
Estonia 5.3 10.1 10.4 21.8 21.7 23.1 0.3 
Slovenia 12.0 8.5 10.4 18.5 18.3 19.3 0.4 
EU 27 9.4 8.7 9.7 23.5 23.4 24.2 119.6 
EU 15 6.5 5.8 6.9 21.4 21.6 22.1 88.2 
Source: Eurostat [9,10]. 
a = Or vegetarian equivalent every second day. 
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endangering soils, water and human health), the 
business of vegetable protein production does not 
require large manpower resources. In the middle of the 
2000s, in Brazil, soya occupied 8 times higher share in 
planted area than in agricultural employment, while in 
Argentina the extremely mechanised production model 
only needed 2 full-time workers for 1,000 hectares of 
land [16]. Lands and production are concentrated in the 
hands of ever fewer investors and farm operators. The 
majority of the crop is grown in large monocultures 
from where, in several cases because of lack of secure 
land titles, rural families have been expelled. What is 
worse, only a minority of them can find job on the 
plantations, others have to move further into the 
forests, thereby increasing deforestation, breaking 
virgin ground, overgrazing sensitive meadows, or 
migrate into cities, where they soon get familiar with 
misery and hunger. So, the expansion of soybean 
plantation in South America has not only significant 
ecological but also social price. 
Other possible factors that might have been 
contributed to rising food prices, and consequently to 
rising world hunger in the last couple of years, are: 
- a rapid change in demand, especially the 
growing consumption of meat in newly 
industrialising countries and the growing share of 
energy crops in agricultural production; 
- the impact of some external factors, like rising oil 
price, the devaluation of US dollar and the 
widespread recourse to trade barriers (e.g. 
exports restrictions and taxes) as a reaction of 
many stages to the rapidly rising food prices; 
- Finally, the increasing speculation in futures 
markets. 
Although Halder [17] demonstrated that, with the 
exception of the last mentioned factor (i.e. speculation, 
identified as the primary cause for high food prices), all 
others could only partly explain the extent of the price 
rise, large group of experts found FAO’s data about 
growing world hunger credible and compatible with 
their own experiences. As these experiences showed 
that, with the globalisation process gaining momentum, 
not only the developing but also the developed 
countries had been experiencing rising differences in 
living standards between people. Many of the losers of 
this process got unemployed, lost their homes, plunged 
into poverty and hunger. This trend had only been 
amplified by the combined effects of repeated food 
crisis (since 2006/2008) and the financial and 
economic crisis (since 2008). Moreover, to explain the 
contradiction between abundant food supply and 
pervasive hunger, i.e. between growing (total and per 
capita) food production (and trade) and the rising 
number of undernourished, both the expanding use of 
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Figure 5: World ethanol and biodiesel production, 2000-2011. 
Source: REN21 [19]. 
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agricultural products (and land) for energy and the 
increasing meat consumption of China (and other fast-
growing countries) seemed to be logical answers.  
Here, two comments are necessary. First, although 
crop grown for biofuels utilise around 1 per cent of 
agricultural land [18], it is a rapidly developing 
business: between 2000 and 2010 world production of 
ethanol increased by more than 5 times, that of the 
biodiesel by more than 20 times (Figure 5). Nowadays, 
there is more and more criticism about biofuel 
production for consuming too much freshwater [20] and 
inducing probably as large or larger land use change 
emissions than projected GHG emissions savings 
could stem from using biofuels as a substitute for fossil 
fuels [21]. Second, although China has been able to 
meet the rising food demand on home market from its 
own booming agro-business, soybean is a notable 
exception the imports of which may have the same 
devastating effects on small farmers in exporting 
countries as in the case of EU soya imports [22,23].  
3.1. Assessment of Undernourishment 
As far as the world’s millions of hungry people are 
concerned, first, for 2009 and 2010, FAO published 
estimates which were based not on its own data and 
methodology but on those of United States Department 
of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA 
ERS) [24]. However, from the data available until 2008, 
it can be clearly seen that, after 1995, the number of 
starving people has increased steadily (see the red 
pecked line on Figure 4). Moreover, in stark contrast to 
the hunger alleviation goals set in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MGDs) of the United Nations, 
which dates back to the Millennium Summit of 2000 
and the target 1C is about to halve, between 1990 and 
2015, the proportion of the people of the world who 
suffer from hunger [25], a reversal of a long tendency 
of diminution of the proportion of the undernourished in 
the developing world did appear in 2008 [26]. 
Later on, in its issue “The State of Food Insecurity in 
the World 2011” the FAO announced that an effort was 
under way to review its methodology for estimating 
undernourishment. With 2011 being a year of 
transition, updated estimates for the number of hungry 
people in 2009 and 2010 were not reported, nor had an 
estimate been made for 2011 [27]. Finally, the 2012 
issue revealed that the experts in FAO had, over the 
two previous years, not only overhauled the 
methodology used to estimate hunger, but also 
rewritten (“improved” by the official terminology) the 
estimates of the number and hence the proportion of 
undernourished people going back to 1990 (see the 
white descending line in Figure 4). This kind of 
changing data retroactively for 20 years has had two 
important consequences: first, the trend in the number 
of hungry people, which for most of the period (namely, 
from 1995 to 2009), was clearly ascending became 
clearly descending; second, any expert analyses based 
on historical data became invalid. The rules of the 
formal logic have been restored: Figure 4 shows that 
when the world is able to produce more food, the 
number of hungry people is decreasing, and when food 
production (as a result of world crisis after 2007) is 
stagnant, the decline in the number of undernourished 
also comes to a halt. 
There is one more very important consequence of 
the change in methodology and the recalculation of 
data: efforts undertaken all over the world to reduce 
hunger yielded better results than previously believed, 
thus, against the expectations based on old FAO 
statistics, the MDG target of halving the prevalence of 
undernourishment in the developing world by 2015 
could be within reach (Table 5 and Figure 6). The data 
generated from the reassessment put the 
undernourishment estimate for developing countries at 
23.2 percent of the population in the base period 
(1990-92), which implies a new MDG target of 11.6 per 
cent for 2015. If the pace of the annual average decline 
of the past 20 years could be maintained, the 
prevalence of hunger, by the calculation of the FAO, 
would decrease to 12.5 percent by 2015, still above the 
(new) target, but much closer to it than previously 
hoped for [28]. 
It is worth noting that FAO’s calculation of its 
undernourishment indicator for 2015, the above 
mentioned 12.5%, is likely to be based on a very 
simple statistical estimate, as if the experts simply laid 
their ruler across the graph (see the blue line of linear 
trend in Figure 6) Although nothing is mentioned about 
the method in FAO’s report, there is high chance a 
linear regression was used to make projections for 
2015. In case we disregard the fact that in today’s 
difficult times of global economic and financial crisis, 
the use of a polynomial trend would have certainly 
been more appropriate (see the green pecked line in 
Figure 6), estimates for 2015 could have also been 
calculated from trends based on the annual average 
decline over either the period from 1990-92 to the last 
years for which data were available, i.e. 2010-2012 
(see column “A” in Table 5 and the yellow line in Figure 
6), or the period from 1990-92 to the last years for 
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Table 5: Prevalence of Hunger, Progress Towards MDG Target (-50%) and Estimates for 2015 
1990-92 2007-09 2010-12
* 
2010-12
*
 
Estimates  
for 2015 
Proportion of undernourished 
in total population (%) 
X Y Z millions 
Change so far 
(%) 
A B 
World 18.6 12.9 12.5 868.0 -32.8 11.54 11.10 
Developed countries 1.9 1.3 1.4 16.0 -26.3 1.32 1.11 
Developing countries 23.2 15.5 14.9 852.0 -35.8 13.64 13.13 
Africa 27.3 22.6 22.9 239.0 -16.1 22.11 20.91 
Western Asia 6.6 9.4 10.1 21.0 53.0 11.00 10.87 
Southern Asia 26.8 18.8 17.6 304.0 -34.3 16.18 16.25 
Eastern Asia 20.8 11.8 11.5 167.0 -44.7 10.21 9.34 
South-Eastern Asia 29.6 13.2 10.9 65.0 -63.2 8.93 9.47 
Latin America 14.6 8.7 8.3 49.0 -43.2 7.41 7.03 
Source: FAO [28] (p. 9.) + the author’s own estimates for 2015, * projections (as indicated by FAO). 
base year = 1990 19921991 = X
last year for which consolidated data are available = 2007  2009 2008 = Y
last year for which data are available = 2010  2012 2011 = Z
1.year (1992) = X q
hypothesis = smooth change over time (q)
 2.year (1993) = X q q = X q2
17.year (2008) = Y = X q17  q = Y
X
17
 20.year (2011) = Z = X q20  q = Z
X
20
forecast for the 21.year (2012) = Z q
forecast for the 24.year (2015) = A = Z q4 = Z  Z
X
20
4
by the same token :
forecast for the 18.year (2009) = Y q
forecast for the 24.year (2015) = B = Y q7 = Y  Y
X
17
7
 
A =
Z
X
20




4
Z  and B = Y
X
17




7
Y  
which consolidated data are available, i.e. 2007-09 
(see column “B” in Table 5 and the pink line in Figure 
6). The existence of the B-pillar in Table 5 is justified by 
the fact that data for 2010-12 are only projections. As it 
is clearly demonstrated by Table 5 and Figure 6, the 
rate of 12.5 percent for prevalence of hunger in 
developing world projected by FAO for 2015 is by far 
the most optimistic estimate. 
Changes in methodology are justified by FAO, on 
the one hand, by the improvement of the assessment 
techniques (e.g. more detailed and more accurate 
statistics being available on demography and anatomy, 
as well as improved parameters for dietary energy 
requirements, etc.), by a better access to household 
survey data on food consumption for a range of 
countries and by new country-specific estimates of food 
losses. On the other hand, the old methodology did not 
capture the impact of short-term price spikes and other 
economic shocks, unless these were reflected in 
changes in long-term food consumption patterns. As far 
as economic downturns are concerned, for many 
developing countries (i.e. China, India or Indonesia), 
global shocks were less pronounced and resulted in 
milder slowdown in GDP growth and smaller increase 
in staple food prices than thought before [29]. It is true, 
however, that considerable differences among 
countries and regions remain: while in Latin-America 
and the eastern and southern parts of Asia substantial 
progress in the reduction of hunger has been achieved, 
the opposite holds true for Western Asia (Table 5). 
Anyhow, global trends took a 180 degree turn as data 
referring to overall changes at the beginning of the 
period had to be corrected upwards and those of recent 
years downwards (see the red and the white lines in 
Figure 4 and data in Figure 7). 
From Figure 7 it appears that for three out of the 
five categories of data (namely population size, food 
supply and methodology) the use of updated values 
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Figure 6: Prevalence of undernourishment in developing world. (Proportion of undernourished in total population (%)). 
Source: FAO [28] in addition to the author’s own estimates for A and B (for method see Table 5). 
*FAO data for 2010-12 are projections. 
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Figure 7: Impact of data and methodology revisions on FAO estimates of the number of undernourished population in 
developing regions (%). 
Source: Table A 2.1 in FAO [28]. 
resulted, at the beginning of the scrutinised period, in 
an increase in the estimated number of 
undernourished, and then, lately, in a reduction in it. As 
far as the data on people’s physical stature (heights) 
are concerned, their (downward) revision resulted in an 
approximately constant reduction in the estimated 
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number of hungry people over the entire period. 
Although the updates of the above mentioned four data 
sets, taken one by one, do not cause important annual 
(percentagewise) changes on FAO’s estimates – the 
only exception being the impact of food supply change 
for 2009 (-8%) – their combined impact would, in 
theory, result in a sharply falling trend line with more 
than 20 percentage points of difference between the 
two end dates of the period. But there is a fifth element, 
food losses, which may be significant during retail 
distribution and storage and which, of all revisions, is 
the one that causes the most dramatic change in 
FAO’s estimates on hunger: its impact shows a slightly 
ascending trend (see the pale blue line in Figure 7) 
departing from +13.2 per cent in 1990-92 and 
culminating at +16.4 percent in 2009, which moderates 
somewhat the steepness of the trend line caused by 
the other four elements. It’s a pity, these high-impact 
estimates of food losses are, according to FAO’s own 
words, “still tentative” and “based on rough regional 
aggregates” [30].  
Finally, how to evaluate FAO’s efforts and 
proceedings to improve its estimates? Refining and 
developing the methodology of data collection can only 
be welcome; moreover, it should also be an inherent 
part of any statistical production process spanning over 
many years. However, changing data retroactively is 
always a delicate affair. Even more so for twenty years, 
as the further we go back in time, the more it becomes 
difficult to gather information to support the change. 
Anyhow, the change created a new situation, and 
brought about a huge task for the analysts to re-
consider the statements and to re-evaluate the 
conclusions that had so far been drawn from the old 
data set. 
If we examine FAO’s new estimates on hunger 
together with data on agricultural (and food) production 
and trade, the least we can say that it was worth to 
produce more food as the number of the 
undernourished has, against all previous reports based 
on the old data set, steadily decreased for the last two 
decades. This is especially good news for the 
developed (e.g. EU) countries where supporters of the 
current new/old trends in agricultural policy (i.e. the one 
with a focus on production and productivity growth) 
seem to have gained a bit of legitimacy; their 
aspirations can now be aligned with the Millennium 
Development Goals. So, there will be a strong 
argument to preserve the traditionally high level of 
public subsidies for European (and other rich 
countries’) agriculture, – a support which has, for the 
last more than fifty years, been transformed into 
farmers/owners movable and immovable property. 
Reforms towards a cheaper and more liberal system of 
agricultural policy are likely to be stopped or watered 
down, thus land owners, especially those in no way 
associated with farming, should not be afraid of a 
sudden drop of value of their properties. 
4. AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN THE EU AND THE 
US VERSUS WORLD HUNGER 
As it was already mentioned, the world’s most 
developed regions – especially the EU and the US – 
are directly responsible, through their agricultural and 
trade policies, for the worsening of the quality of life of 
millions of small farmers, and indirectly for the 
persistence of unacceptably high levels of hunger in 
developing countries. Both in the EU and the US, 
despite decades of reforms, agricultural policy 
continues to favour a relatively small number of highly 
rationalised big farms and export-oriented food 
processors. The reason for this lies in the fact that 
there is a continuous pressure on the policy-makers to 
increase the international competitiveness of the agro-
food business by providing traders and processors with 
cheap agricultural raw materials.  
The main difference in methods used on the two 
sides of the Atlantic is schematically illustrated on 
Figure 8: while in Europe since the 1992 reform, the 
dominant part of subsidies (i.e. CAP direct payments) 
have been paid to farmers regardless of need or 
market conditions, so even at a time of high prices and 
record market income, in America, farm support has 
always had a pronounced counter-cyclical character, 
making most of the support available only when 
commodity markets drop in order to counteract low 
farm prices. The latter method is somewhat cheaper 
which is not surprising as in the US, the average size of 
the professional farms is, for several reasons, much 
bigger than in Europe; so, due to economies of scale, 
production is more efficient and fewer subsidies are 
needed. The damage done to the developing countries 
by US farm policy is, however, comparable to that 
caused by European common agricultural policy, for, 
after all, what matters are the artificially low producer 
prices which obviously would be higher if farmers could 
not rely on public subsidies. These low prices then 
destroy the subsistence farming, hence indirectly 
contributing to hunger and poverty all around the 
developing world. 
Interestingly enough, in 2013, new agricultural 
policy reforms are under discussion in the US and in 
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Europe. Although there is an obvious determination of 
the decision makers to move away from the current 
systems, in that distribution of public support among 
farmers and regions could be less inequitable in the 
future, but this move is either a result of a need to cut 
public deficit (in the case of the US) or is mitigated by 
the fact that most of the changes are optional (in the 
case of the EU). 
In the Unites States, because of a disagreement 
between the two chambers of the current legislature, 
the latest 2008 farm bill, which was set to expire at the 
end of 2012, has been approved for partial extension 
through September 30, 2013. In the meanwhile both 
chambers took up separate farm bills proposals. The 
House version failed to pass on June 20, 2013, while 
that of the Senate (known as the Agriculture Reform, 
Food and Jobs Act of 2013 – S. 954; 113
th
 Congress) 
passed the Senate with an overwhelming bipartisan 
majority of 66-27 on June 10, 2013 and has got the 
support of President Obama. If the bill passes the 
House, it could replace the current bill, known as Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 [31]. The new bill 
eliminates and streamlines numerous programs, and 
strengthens crop insurance and other risk management 
approaches, saving taxpayers USD 23 billion over the 
period of 2014-2023. A large part of the saving comes 
from capping payments under the so-called commodity 
programs ($50,000 per entity) and excluding anyone 
with an adjusted gross income of more than $750,000 
from receiving commodity programs’ benefits [32].  
In the European Union, a political agreement was 
reached on 26 June 2013 by the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament on the reform of 
the common agricultural policy focusing on challenges 
of food security, sustainable use of natural resources 
and growth. While the money available under market 
measures and direct payments will be reduced by more 
than 17 per cent in real terms vis-à-vis to current 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), its distribution 
among members, regions and farmers seem to have a 
chance to become more equitable [33,34]. What could 
lessen the amplitude of changes, however, is the fact 
that several schemes (like the Small Farmers Scheme, 
the redistributive payments for the first hectares or the 
scheme for Areas with Natural Constraints/Less 
Favoured Areas) redirecting support towards smaller 
and weaker farms or regions remain optional for the 
member states [35]. Also, there is risk in transferring 
too much subsidies from the big to the small farms: if 
an EU country went too far on this path, it could 
disadvantage its professional farmers, undermine their 
resilience compared to their European competitors and 
eventually put them in danger of going bankrupt, as it is 
clearly seen in intra-sectoral debates over the issue 
[36]. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we tried to assess the recent 
development of world’s agricultural production and 
trade and shed some light on the problematic of 
evaluation of food insecurity. We also intended to offer 
a brief insight into upcoming agricultural reforms in the 
European Union and the United States. As far as the 
relationship between world agro-food production/trade 
and hunger is concerned, we can conclude that neither 
 
Figure 8: Agricultural policy in the EU and the US: Simplistic models of the policies based on the author’s own experiences in 
the field of both EU and US agricultural policies since 1992 [13]. 
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the increase in food prices nor a possible increase in 
the number of undernourished people can simply be 
explained by the shortage of supply. As a matter of 
fact, in the past twenty years, global trade rose much 
faster than production, and production rose much faster 
than (world) population. Concerning the upcoming 
reforms in the EU and the US, they can be considered 
as the first cautious steps in the right direction, in that 
distribution of public support among farmers and 
regions could be less inequitable in the future. People 
need to see, however, that these changes are certainly 
not driven by developed countries’ anxiety about 
developing countries subsistence farming. There are 
other factors at work instead, like the need for reducing 
public spending which make these changes inevitable, 
and the persistence of high food (and farm-gate) prices 
which make them possible. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, bearing responsibility for food security remains 
at not only national but also international level, and 
hence the necessity of improving competitiveness for 
home producers continue to fit into the strategic goals 
of the agricultural policy. Anyway, the above depicted 
change in FAO’s estimation method on hunger – 
changing data retroactively for 20 years and turning the 
formerly ascending trend of the number of 
undernourished into a clearly descending one – 
provides justification to the supporters of a strong 
agricultural policy (i.e. with a focus on production and 
productivity growth), as their aspirations can now be 
aligned with the Millennium Development Goals. The 
author of this paper tends to agree with those (e.g. the 
experts of such organisations like Via Campesina, an 
international movement defending small-scale 
sustainable agriculture against corporate driven 
agriculture and transnational companies [37,38] who 
claim the right of the developing countries to make 
everything to improve and reach their self-sufficiency in 
major food staples and to control the marketing of their 
products. A comprehensive overhaul of the agricultural 
policies in developed countries could improve chances 
for the long-term sustainability of both social and 
natural environment for agriculture throughout the 
developing world. Thus, global food security could be 
significantly enhanced.  
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